ARE DEMOCRACIES MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TERRORISM THAN TOTALITARIAN STATES? A DISCOURSE

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Abstract
This paper listed for discussion conceptual description of democracy and totalitarianism with a view to justify model of government that is rapidly susceptible to terrorism. The tenet of the paper differentiates forms of democracies and totalitarianism; develops construct of terrorism in the context of government. The paper relied on secondary data, historical account and archives to construct premise of explanation. Democracies and totalitarianism are forms of government which evidently were adopted by cosmopolitans to govern between the ruler and the governed. Social democracy is consisted among socialist societies; liberal democracy is consisted among capitalist societies. Socialist democracy flourishes in the ruling of authoritarians and fascists. Liberal democracy flourishes in the ruling of pluralists and sub power levels. Totalitarian is a power dictator and supreme leader. Social democracy is mild and allows collective government; liberal democracy is collective government and power is evenly distributed in the organs. Totalitarianism is absolute and rule by decree. Terrorism is force of agitation and suicidal in the approach. Social democracy is mild, it is mildly susceptible to terrorism; liberal democracy is weak, it is susceptible to terrorism; totalitarianism is rigid, it is less susceptible. Terrorism flourishes in liberal democracy of Africa like Nigeria due to multiplicity of ethno-religious characteristics. Terrorism is less enforceable in western liberal democracy which is largely ethnic homogenous. Terrorism is likely to persist in Nigeria, except government develops equally to benefit ethno-religious groups.

Keywords: Government, Development, Ethnicity, Religion; Democracy.

Introduction
Our age is the age of terrorism. Interestingly, one also begins to wonder whether this terrorism is as a result of “the clash of civilisations” (Huntington, 1993a, 1993b, 1996), or the result of the incompatibility between “Jihad vs McWorld” (Barber, 1992, 1995), or the result of Guven’s (2006, p. 63) “clash of cultures” or Said’s (2004/05, pp. 214-216) “clash of ignorance.” Whichever, it is sufficient for us to know that terrorism is not a philosophy or a political movement, but a special form of political violence. It is a weapon or a method whose history
can be traced to the antiquity and used by state, sub-state organisations and non-state actors for a variety of reasons, causes and purposes. This mode of insurgency has five major characteristics (Wilkinson, 2004/05, p. 9) that separates it from other methods of insurrections such as guerilla warfare, coups and civil wars. First is that acts of terrorism are premeditated with the sole aim of creating a climate of fear or terror in the hearts of men. Second is that it is primarily directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence. The more collateral damage cause by their attacks, the better for the message they want to pass across.

Third is that the attacks are directed at random and symbolic targets (not necessarily military) particularly areas where civilians are apt to congregate like markets, malls and religious places of worship like churches and mosques. Fourth is that these acts of violence committed by terrorists are breaches on the social norms of society and what society would normally accepted as being within the normal or parameters of the law of armed conflicts. Lastly, terrorism as an act is geared towards influencing political leaders in one way or the other. It is generally used to send a message or publicise a political or religious cause, to express deep-seated hatred or thirst for revenge and in most cases, to undermine the effectiveness of the government and institutions designated as enemies by the terrorists.

As a concept, terrorism suffers from definitional crises (Schmid and Jongman 2005, Kegley 1990, Wilkinson 1974). However, an easier way of understanding it is to view it from a typology lens. The academic role which typology plays is to sub-divide a concept into categories which are more manageable for research and analysis. Four types are easily identifiable. First is the distinction between state and factional terrorism. The literature on state terrorism or state sponsored terrorism is fast on the increase (Arendt 1967, Stohl and Lopez 1984, Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956, Lopez and Stohl 1986). These literature and many more catalogued the sheer scale of crimes against humanity, various war crimes and mass terror that have been and are being committed by regimes. In some cases, it must be noted that state terror has often been an antecedent, a precursor and contributory cause of factional or sub-state terrorism. Historically, state-sponsored terrorism connotes the use of terror as an explicit tactic or strategy of the state. The state’s action in this regard is not only shrouded in secrecy but cloaked with the garment of legitimacy. Instances of this abound in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Argentina in the 1970s and early 1980s, Pinochet’s Chile, modern day Colombia and against the Kurdish peoples in Turkey and Iraq. Violence would always begets violence because once a government engages in terrorism and sees their ends as justifying the means, they inevitably get locked into a spiral of violence and terror and counter terror against their own citizens whom they assume s adversaries.

Second type emerges from the distinction between international terrorism, involving the citizens of two or more states and domestic or internal terrorism whose activities are localized and constraint within the geographical boundaries or territory of a specific state. Therefore, trend analysis of terrorism based on international incident statistics will not provide us with the accurate picture of world trends because it excludes domestic terrorism which constitutes well over 90% of total global terrorists activities. It must be stated that what is usually termed as domestic terrorism often have international dimensions. Following the example of Boko Haram in Nigeria, what started as an in-born terrorist activities have blossomed to include
external terrorist groups as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State for West Africa Region (ISWAP) and affiliations with other terrorist groups. Experience has shown that leaders of domestic terrorist groups expend considerable efforts to have external support and sources of funds, weapons, safe haven, training opportunities and other assets from friendly governments and political movements as well as from their own Diasporas. Third type is by classifying terrorist groups according to their underlying political motivation or ideological proclivities or orientation. Thus, a comprehensive review of the literature will show that terrorist groups are motivated by diverse factors on the basis of which they justify their actions. Such motivating factors range from a sense of nationalism to separatism, racism, vigilantism, ultra-left or right ideology, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, millennialism and single issue campaigns such as animal rights, antiabortion etc. (See Wilkinson, 1986a, 1986b).

The final type is the distinction between political and religious terrorism. This distinction is important because virtually all current terrorist organisations wholly or in part professed to be motivated by religious fanaticism. As far back as the 1970s, all active terrorist groups have secular goal and objectives with majority professing some variant of Marxism. By the end of the 1990s, a shift became discernible; over 90% of active terrorist groups now profess and justify their actions on the basis of some religion; specifically Islamic religion. The distinction between religious and political terrorists may seem superfluous and academic, perhaps, because of the very existence of a political agenda underlying their religious assertions. Instances of this abound and include the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) demands an Islamic Republic in Algeria, Hezbollah wants an Islamic republic in Lebanon, Hamas wants an Islamic republic in Palestine and coming home, Boko Haram would not end until Nigeria becomes an Islamic state. The political agenda of ISIS is very clear from the different cells they have. For instance, ISWAP wants the entire West African region to become Islamic.

Nonetheless, a distinction between political and religious terrorism is necessary and important because it shows fundamental differences in their operations and mind-set. This brings to recall Kittrie’s (1981, p. 300) assertion that for a terrorist action to qualify as being politically motivated, it must “challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties.” Thus, religious motivated terrorism (such as Boko Haram, Al Shabbah, ISIS etc.) differs from political terrorism, first, in that while political terrorism attempts to find a resolution within the life times of the perpetrators, religious terrorism outlives their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and the time limit of their struggle is eternity. Second, targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military, political or economic values but rather they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness both by its brutality and suddenness. Third, the constant recourse to a ‘god’ to justify their action has the tendency to ‘satanise’ the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism ‘godly’. As Juergensmeyer (2004, pp. 34-38) had noted, this is a kind of “perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators’ views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war”. The effect of this, as he had also noted, is “not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised. Through enduring absolutism, worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battles”.

ARE DEMOCRACIES MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TERRORISM THAN TOTALITARIAN STATES? A DISCOURSE
Fourth is that the targets of religious terrorism and violence also have the tendency to assume a similar religious mien, explanation and perspective. For instance, following the 9/11 attacks, the song, “God bless America” acquired a new religious implication and the anti-terrorism posture of America became a righteous cause to bring an end to the “absolute evil” of its enemies. Fifth is that the ‘divine’ nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘truth’ and ‘evil’, the expectation of heavenly rewards for the terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a negotiated peaceful resolution in this lifetime. Sixth is the spiritual dimension of the war which makes it to go beyond the confines of human law and ideal of morality. Society’s law are subordinated and in extreme cases are deemed non-existence or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. The belief and perception here is that society’s laws and limitations are of no relevance when one is obeying a higher ‘divine’ authority. Seventh and finally, the end result of religious terrorism is that it impacts a sense of redemption and dignity on the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism acquires a personal willingness on the part of the perpetrators who often times are men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life.

This paper is sectionalized into four, with an introduction followed by a theoretical delineation between authoritarianism-totalitarianism and democracy. The third section looks at why democratic systems seems to attract terrorism and terrorist activities. This is followed by the conclusion. The paper is a theoretical exposition.

Totalitarianism vs. Democracy

Although the concept of democracy has become more complex than the simple Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg address (1864) which extolled the virtues of democracy as ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people,’ it, nevertheless, highlighted three core features of democracy. First is that the emphasis on ‘the people’ directs attention to the element of political equality inherent in the practice of democracy, the equal distribution of political power and influence. Secondly, the stress on government ‘by’ the people implies that democracy is based on popular participation, and thirdly, the mention of ‘for’ the people further highlights the notion that democracy means ruling in the interest of the public.

However, as part of the modern day complexity of the concept is the fact that it is common to make a distinction between direct democracy and representative democracy. Direct democracy, as a term, overlaps with classical democracy, radical and participatory democracy and it is based on the direct, unmediated and continuous participation of citizens in the tasks of government (Heywood 2011, p. 126). It negates any and every distinction between government and the governed, between the state and civil society. Representative democracy, on the other hand, is also known as liberal democracy but limited in that popular participation in government is restricted to every election year and the act of voting four every four years. Thus, this form of government is deemed democratic and acceptable only insofar as there is a reliable and effective link between the government and the governed which is usually expressed through an electoral mandate (Heywood 2011).

Huntington’s (1991, p. 15) exegesis on democratisation has identified three waves in the world. The first wave he identified as having started from 1828 and terminating in 1926, while the second wave was from 1943 to 1964. The third wave which began in 1974 penetrated the
former Eastern bloc in the 1980s and Africa earlier; from the 1970s. The micro-nationalism movements that saw former members of the Soviet federation clamouring for independence and which devastated and led to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, ushered in the present era of Post-Cold War. This, coupled with the advent of globalisation as both a political and economic alternative to imperialism, had made democracy an attractive option to former authoritarian and autocratic regimes in Africa and East Europe.

Apologists of democracy have persistently argued that democracy is much broader than its being just another political form, a method of conducting government, of making laws and administering a state by means of popular suffrage and elected officials. Rather, they have seen it as including within it the best means for realising human relationships and the development of human personality. The keynote of democracy is the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in the formation of the values that regulate the living of men together. Thus, universal suffrage, recurring elections, responsibility of those who are in political power to the voters and other factors normally associated with democratic government are means that have been found expedient and necessary for realising democracy as the truly human way of living.

In concrete terms, democracy provides a level ground for the practice of politics and the involvement of all in politics. The foundation of democracy rests by faith in the capacities of human intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative co-existence. The underlying idea and principle is that no man or set of men is wise enough or good enough to rule others without their consents. Implied in this idea is that everyone is affected by the social institutions of the state and therefore must have a share in producing and managing them. Democracy also rests on the doctrine of equality, not equality of natural endowments but equality as a legal and political doctrine. It is under this belief that democracy guarantee equality of treatment under the law and in its administration. Every individual within a state is therefore expected to be affected equally in quality even if not in quantity by the institutions of the state and should have equal right to express his judgment. Given the possibility of natural and psychological inequality and the potency of this to become means of oppression of the less gifted, democracy sets the law of equality of opportunity which allows for every individual to contribute and it is the value of each contribution that is assessed in the final pooled intelligence constituted by the contributions of all.

The appeal of democratic government and the democratic faith is that every individual has the chance and opportunity to contribute depending on his capabilities and the value of his contribution is decided by its place and function in the organised total of similar contributions and not on the basis of prior status of any kind whatsoever. The essential feature of democracy which lies in its concern for the participation of the member in the process by which the community is governed, equally gives to each citizen a public office, a place in the sovereign tribunal. The citizen in his political capacity therefore, becomes a public agent thereby making government not a tool for impulsiveness but the instrument of collective deliberation. Democracy, therefore, is the substitution of the method of mutual consultation and voluntary agreement for the method of subordination of the many to the few enforced from above. Inherent in this is that any form of exclusion from participation becomes a subtle form of suppression.
Autocratic and authoritarianism are concepts usually used interchangeably with totalitarianism. However, according to Heywood (2011, p. 158), authoritarianism is a belief in or the practice of government ‘from above’ in which political rule is imposed on the society regardless of its consent. Thus, authoritarian rule is commonly associated with monarchical, absolutism, traditional dictatorships and some forms of military rule and as Heywood (2011) has distinguished, authoritarianism is distinct from totalitarianism on the grounds that that it is primarily concerned with the repression of opposition and political liberty, rather than with the more radical goal of obliterating the distinction between the state and civil society. Thus, some authoritarian regimes may tolerate a significant range of economic, religious and other freedoms. Totalitarianism differs from both authoritarianism and autocracy in that it seeks ‘total power’ though the politicization of every aspect of social and personal existence, it thrives on the total abolition of civil society and everything deemed as ‘private’ (Heywood 2011, p. 184).

According to Friedrich and Brzezinski (1966), totalitarian systems are defined as having 6 basic features; (1) a socialist ideology consisting of an official doctrine covering all aspect of life which everyone is to follow and which projects an eventually perfect state of mankind, (2) a single party usually led by one person consisting of a small percentage of the population dedicated to the ideology, (3) a system of terror and violence applied by the party or a secret police using modern scientific method, (4) technologically conditioned, nearly complete monopoly controlled by the party and government of all effective means of mass communication, (5) similar control of the effective use of all weapons of armed combat, and (6) central control and direction of the entire economic and most of other social organizations. The authors were later to modify these characteristics and argued that they should be seen as patterns. In other word, the presence of a dictatorship and a single party system do not qualify as a totalitarian system if this do not include the leaders acting on the basis of an ideology or mobilising the population in the direction of some ideal society. The definition was later modified to mean that totalitarianism is a new form of government falling into the general classification of dictatorship, a system in which technically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralised leadership of an elite movement for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions, proclaimed by the leadership in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.

While Friedrich and Brzezinski (1966) have offered a comprehensive definition of totalitarianism, others have focused on its essence. Arendt (1967) spoke of its total terror and argued that such systems have gone beyond the mere use of terror to a point where their very essence is terror. Others have pointed to the totalistic element of such systems, the politicisation of society such that everything is controlled by those in power. In totalitarian states, the line between the state and society is destroyed, the state claims to direct all aspects of human activities in accordance with its ideology and as Heywood (2011, p. 185) has put it, “everything for the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state.”

Totalitarian systems are not uncommon in history. They usually take such forms as empires, theocracy, tyranny, divine right monarchy and traditional dictatorships. But a most significant
feature of this century is the social and economic phenomenon of industrialisation and modernisation and the rise of new ideologies in reaction to this socio-economic development. One of these new ideologies is Marxism, the philosophical foundation of Communism, while others are Fascism and National Socialism (Nazism). Beginning with the revolution in Russia in 1917, this new pattern of government emphasising the state control of most social and industrial activities has been seen as autocratic or totalitarian. However, Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) in Russia and the 1989 riot or demonstration in China’s Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and the ‘velvet revolutions’ with experiments in political and economic reforms in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have turned former autocratic countries into somewhat democratic ones. The USSR’s claim to democracy rests in part on the holding of regular elections. The communist party’s claim to legitimacy does not rest solely on the fact that the leaders were elected, but rather on a mixture of process and ideology. This mixture is a combination of Rousseau’s concept of the leader being the embodiment of the mystical general will and Hitler’s claim to embody the true values and spirit of the people.

Thus, totalitarian leaders may not see any contradiction between their electoral process and the concept of democracy because they profess to represent and act on behalf of the people. So in such an arrangement, there is no need for competitive elections. The party rules on behalf of the peoples’ best interest and from time to time, the people signify their approval by re-electing the party’s candidate. Hence, the idea of ‘totalitarian democracy’ portends a phenomenon whereby a leader justifies his unchecked power through a claim to possess a monopoly of ideological wisdom and to articulate the true interests of his people. However, Marcuse (1964) has proposed a different theory of totalitarianism by identifying totalitarian tendencies even in advanced industrial societies by viewing them as ‘one-dimensional societies’ in which rising affluence helps to subdue argument and debate and absorb all forms of opposition.

In contrasting these two systems of governance, the basic difference between them will seem to revolve around the classic question of the relationship of the individual with the state or society.

Democracy emphasises the importance of a relationship that encourages criticism and the expression of various points of view and the state as an instrument to serve the people while totalitarian systems are characterised by the idea of a vanguard party or group that claims to know what is best for society. This means that there is no need for other parties in the political process. The interests of the individual are to be subordinated to those of the society as a whole. In a totalitarian system, apathy and lack of participation of the people are not acceptable since working, voting and many other social activities become obligations rather than matters of choice.

**Democracy and Terrorism**

Experience and overwhelming statistical data have shown that the majority of terrorists’ attacks take place within the borders of nation-states or within territories where a nation-state has control and is responsible for maintaining national security and upholding law and order. In those cases and instances where domestic or intra-state terrorism spill over to and across
into another state’s territory, it is the national authorities of the afflicted state that have the right to respond as they see fit. For instance, Boko Haram whose root is in the North-east of Nigeria has now spilled over the border into neighbouring Niger, Cameroon and Chad republics and these countries respond to the threats and mount reprisal or counter operations as they see fit. Thus, in this age of globalization, it will be improbable to find terrorist actions that are limited or restricted to one geographical space or territory of a single state. Every terrorist group avail itself of the opportunity of affiliating with other groups to establish overseas support networks, sources of funds, access to arms and weaponry, supplies, political and propaganda support, logistics and safe haven. Hence, the affiliation of the different terrorist groups with al Qaeda and later with ISIS which accords them some kind of relevance and ‘legitimacy’ and access to available group support networks (Agara, et al, 2017).

Events in the 20th century has shown us that while, in theory, democracies of the liberal persuasion, may be deemed free of the massive repressions found in totalitarian states, they are still vulnerable and susceptible to the activities of terrorist groups. The very same features that made liberal democracies appealing are been exploited by terrorist groups. The very freedoms democratic government provides which constitutes the hallmark of an open pluralistic system; freedom of movement within and across borders, freedom of association and expression etc. are open to exploitation by the members of these groups to perpetrate their intentions. The notion of equality as a legal and political doctrine guarantees equality of treatment under the law and in its administration further emboldens terrorists by the fact that no matter how atrocious their acts may be, they can be sure that they would have their day before a legally constituted court and not be summarily killed or torture as the case may be in totalitarian systems. As in the case of a federal system with its heterogeneity, even a hardened terrorist when caught can play and leverage on the ethnic/tribal or religious persecution to gain some sympathy from people of his kind.

As Borden (2004) has noted, there have always been conflicts between individual rights and national security interests in democracies. Placing limitations on civil liberties, particularly during wartime, such as restrictions on free speech, public assemblies, and mass detentions, have been the most serious threats to individual freedom. However, in peacetime, counter-terrorist measures which include profiling, detention, and exclusion, along with the use of national identification cards, have always raised concerns about targeting specific race and the cry against racism, constitutional violations, and the loss of privacy. Following in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the passage of new anti-terrorist laws, supporters of broader governmental powers acclaimed that the measures taken were necessary part of the increased security measures to safeguard national security. In contrast, many civil rights groups fear that the infringement upon individual rights is another step in the erosion of democratic civil society; same rights that have been exploited by the terrorists to perpetrate these heinous acts.

The event of 9/11 was interpreted as an act of war against the America nation and people, and history has persistently manifest the fact that severest restrictions on civil liberties have occurred in times of war. For instance, in September 1862, during the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) suspended the right of habeas corpus in order to allow federal authorities to arrest and detain suspected Confederate sympathizers without arrest warrants or speedy trials. Although well aware of the drastic nature of such a law,
Lincoln justified it as a necessary wartime measure. After the United States Supreme Court found Lincoln’s abrogation of habeas corpus an unconstitutional intrusion on Congressional authority, Congress itself ratified the measure by passing the Habeas Corpus Act in September 1863. Through 1864, about 14,000 people were arrested under the act; about one in seven were detained at length in federal prisons, most on allegations of offering aid to the Confederacy but others on corruption and fraud.

The suspension of a basic constitutional right such as the habeas corpus has long been debated by historians whether it was indeed justified, even though Article 1, Section 9, of the American Constitution do allow for it to be suspended especially “in cases of rebellion or invasion” in the name of public safety. The controversy this generated continued through the Reconstruction Era (1866–1876) and the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which further reiterated the use of federal military intervention and suspension of habeas corpus to force state officials to secure voting rights, jury service, and equal protection under the law for all citizens regardless of race. The conflicts and controversies attendant to suspension of constitutionally endowed rights in democratic states is not limited to the United States only. Other democracies have also faced similar conflict between maintaining the individual rights of their citizens and conducting vital intelligence and security operations. While the United States government is quick to reassure its citizens that their civil liberties would be safeguarded, however, some nations have responded somewhat differently in the face of imminent and unrelenting terrorist threats.

For instance, the threat of terrorist attacks by its neighbors had been a constant presence in Israelis’ life, particularly since the first bombings by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1965. The PLO’s terrorist campaign against Israel became acute during its Intifada (or “shaking off”) of Israeli authority in the Occupied Territories in 1987 and again in 2001 (Agara, 2020). The threat of terrorism is ranked as one of the state’s most pressing concerns and this made for Israel’s law to allow for the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists without trial and forbid public shows of support for terrorist groups. Although these measures were stridently condemned by many in the international community as selectively applied against non-Israelis, the country’s leaders consistently defended the practices as a necessity for survival in the face of imminent and ongoing terrorist threats. The United Kingdom has also faced international criticism for its actions against the Irish Republican Army’s violence in protest of the British presence in Northern Ireland. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974, British authorities could arrest suspected terrorists without a warrant and detain them for a week without bringing charges against them. Of course, while being interned, the detainees can and may be subjected to a range of harsh practices that included “hooding”—being isolated and forced to wear a hood over their heads—noise bombardment, and sleep and food deprivation.

Post-September 11 developments in USA saw the enactment of stricter counter-terrorist measures that once again raised concerns about the sanctity of individual civil liberties. On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act into law, giving the FBI and CIA broader investigatory powers and allowing them to share confidential information about suspected terrorists with one another. Under the act, both agencies could conduct residential searches without a warrant and without the presence of the suspect and could seize
personal records on the spot. The provisions were not limited to investigating suspected terrorists, but were allowed in any criminal investigation. The Patriot Act also granted the FBI and CIA greater latitude in using computer tracking devices such as the Carnivore (DCS1000) to gain access to Internet and phone records. The United Kingdom also passed a new counterterrorist bill in December 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act which allowed authorities to detain suspected terrorists for up to six months before reviewing their cases and for additional six-month periods after that. As in the United States, watchdogs in the United Kingdom criticized the new law for potentially infringing upon a basic civil liberty, in this case the right to avoid unlawful detention and gain access to a speedy trial. The controversy over post-September 11, 2001, measures also extended to the screening of passengers on commercial airplanes. The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), which had been selectively used before September 11, now came into wider usage in American airports. CAPPS looked at numerous factors to determine whether a passenger represented an elevated risk of being a terrorist, including how the plane ticket was bought, whether it was a round-trip or one-way ticket, and where the flight originated.

All these measures notwithstanding, we must not lose sight of the fact that governments of well-established and effective liberal democracies enjoy some form of credibility and legitimacy, at least, in the eyes of the majority of its citizens. This grants such government great and enormous resilience in resisting the strategic agendas of terrorists. Hence, the government is assured of the fact that its citizens will almost always rally and support their democratic institutions against those who want to impose on the democratic system what they could not get legally through the ballot box. Theorists and apologists of liberal democracy are agreed that liberal democracies do not go to war against each other and this claim gives additional impetus for supporting the spread of liberal democratic form of government. Thus, liberal democracy has what could be termed as ‘a strong immune system’ which protects it against possible take-over by extremists using the weapon of terrorism.

In plural societies of the federal type, experience has shown that the majority of terrorist violence is spawned by the basic differences in such societies. Common among these societies are the differences occasioned by ethnic or ethno-religious differences and the conflicts engendered is prosecuted with other methods of struggle including guerrilla and full-scale conventional and unconventional warfare. In Nigeria, for instance, if the national government could put much greater effort into promoting dialogue, mediation and conciliation of the different ethnic groups, many insurgencies and terrorist actions mounted by the different ethnic militias may have been avoided. Terrorist groups and ethnic militias using bombings, shooting attacks, suicide bombers hostage taking and kidnappings in liberal democracies have simply proved that they have the ability to cause death and injury and to inflict severe damage and disruption to the smooth working of the democratic system. Such groups have resorted to these tactics of insurgencies because they are encouraged that terrorism can win them the tactical gains they desired such as free and useful publicity for their cause and opportunities to raise funds, garnered needed support, obtain weapons and additional recruits.

Conclusion
It would seem that of a truth, democracies are prone to terrorist activities than totalitarian states because the very same features that made democracy appealing and desirable as a
ARE DEMOCRACIES MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TERRORISM THAN TOTALITARIAN STATES? A DISCOURSE

governmental format can be and are been exploited by terrorists for their sake. A cursory look at Libya during and after Gaddafi will show a glaring difference that is reminiscent of all totalitarian states. The fact that totalitarian states are not restricted and limited in their use of violence and state repression of activities they see as inimical to the state doctrines, clearly assist in suppressing any contrary social movements. The intolerance of and the brutal suppression of social movements whose agendas are not in consonant with the state’s policies, the total disregard of legality and respect for human rights, disregard of society norms that govern and determine state’s behavior and the ready ability to use violence and exercise the state’s monopoly of force, everything that gags and restricts liberal democracy but not the totalitarian state, all ensure that non-state actors terrorist activities are curbed and brought under control. The present increase and global dimension of terrorism we are experiencing may actually be as a result of the fact that the world today has accepted democratization as a desired governmental system and format.

References


ARE DEMOCRACIES MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TERRORISM THAN TOTALITARIAN STATES? A DISCOURSE

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